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lV 
lN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH-IDAHO SCHOOL SUPPLY 
COMP ANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE BUILDING 
BOARD and HERBERT :F. S:MART, 
Director of Finance of the State of Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
AMERICAN DESK MANUF AC-
TURING COMP ANY, 
Intervenor and Appellant. 
Case No. 
11395 
Plaintiff and Respondent's Brief 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This proceeding sought a declaratory judgment of 
Utah law applicable to the bidding and letting of state 
contracts for the acquisition of fixtures and equipment, 
and particularly such contracts using "Campus Funds." 
This suit was required after the Attorney General is-
sued an opinion reversing the prior position of that 
1 
office and the long-standing procedures of the State 
Building Board by holding the Board could not issue 
a contract for 14,847 sea ts to be installed in the "Special 
Events Arena" of the University of Utah to plaintiff, 
who had bid $301,987.98 for one type of seat, and must 
contract with intervenor, who had bid $296,049.00 for 
a different seat, even though plaintiff's seat had been 
determined to be superior in quality and its bid the 
best bid by both the University Board of Regents and 
the State Building Board. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
After a trial of the issues a declaratory judgment 
was entered, which found that the Utah State Building 
Board was authorized to exercise its judgment and dis-
cretion as to which of the types of seating that had 
been bid was best suited for the intended purposes and 
afforded the greatest value and utility, and that it had 
properly accepted the recommendation of the U niver-
sity' s Board of Regents and validly exercised its dis-
cretion and judgment in determining that the plaintiff's 
bid was the best bid and that it was not bound to con-
tract for the seating with the low bidder when a valid 
difference in values had been determined. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This respondent urges the Supreme Court to affirm 
the findings and declaratory judgment as entered by 
the District Court. 
2 
STATEI\IENT OF FACTS 
Intervenor's Statement of Facts is incomplete and 
misleading, and it is therefore necessary to inform th>.: 
court of the following additional facts: 
The permanent seating to be furnished and in-
stalled in the "Special Events Arena" in the University 
of Utah was bid separately from the general construc-
tion contract for the arena, under separate specifications 
(R. 115, Exhibit P-1). The procedure followed by the 
State of Utah for the acquisition of equipment and 
supplies is to have the Department of Finance bid and 
let the contracts unless there is labor or installation 
charges involved, in which event the Department of 
Finance calls for bids and then transmits the bids to 
the State Building Board for the letting by it of the 
contract (R. 109, 133). The specification used for this 
seating was what is known as a modified base bid type 
specification. This type specification is one in which 
several items are specified and the owner then makes 
the final determination as to which is superior. This is 
distinguishable from what is known as a bidder's choice 
type specification, wherein the specification contains 
two or more brand names and the contractor has the 
option of providing under the contract any of the prod-
ucts named. ( R. 128, 129, 130, 132). This type of 
specification has been used by the Utah State Building 
Board for a number of years in order to maintain con-
trol over the quality of items specified and bid (R. 134, 
135). 
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As indicated by the intervenor, the specifications 
for the 14,847 seats to be furnished and installed desig-
nated by model and make four different types of seat-
ing. One of the four types was manufactured by the 
intervenor and the other three by the plaintiff. Each of 
these four types of seats had some different character-
istics, as is indicated by the following brief descriptions: 
Seat Type 1 was American Seating Chair No. 4210 
(Exhibit P-1, page A/2). It was a bucket style seat of 
single-wall plastic supported by a steel frame which 
is affixed to a horizontal beam that is attached to a riser. 
Seat Type 2 was the same identical Chair No. 4210 
as Type 1, but with an additional attachment to the 
under side of the seat known as "Accoustical Treat-
ment." (Exhibit P-1, page Alo) 
Seat Type 3, American Seating Chair No. 104, dif-
fered greatly in style from Types 1 and 2. It had a 
separate seat and back of double wall plastic with cast 
iron standards affixed directly to the riser rather than 
to a beam, and also was the only chair specified with 
plastic arms. 
Seat Type 4, American Desk Series 2810 and 2910 
Chair, while similar in style to Seat Type 3, had many 
different qualities and characteristics, including alu-
minum standards rather than cast iron, and a seat and 
back of single-wall plastic without any steel re-enforce-
ment. Other differences between Type 3 and Type 4 
are set forth in some detail in the minutes of the Board 
4 
of Regents meeting of December 11, 1967 (R-26, :27). 
(Also see July 10, 1967 letter from Director of Univer-
sity of Utah Planning and Construction to the Build-
ing Hoard.) ( R-35.) 
The specifications contain a number of provisions 
which expressly provided that the differing qualities of 
the sea ts would be carefully inspected and examined 
before the successful bidder was determined, and that 
the bid price would not be solely determinative. Some 
of these provisions of the specifications found in ExhiLit 
P-1 are as follows: 
Sec. 2 .... 
4. . .. Detailed specifications have been writ-
ten for various seats as manufactured by different 
companies so that the Owner can evaluate the 
actual seat (as submitted by sample) and its cost 
and shall then select whatever seat deemed most 
consistent with his interests, regardless of cost. 
All bidders must indicate both unit and total 
costs for their seats. 
5. The owner reserves the right to reject any 
or all proposals or any combination thereof, and 
may waive any informalities. 
(Page IB/l and 2) 
9. The contract with the Utah State Building 
Board will be awarded as soon as possible to any 
responsible bidder and/ or bidders deemed most 
desirable by the Owner regardless of price. 
(Page IB/3) 
Sec. 30. . .. 
I. The Contractor's past jerformance, or-
ganization, equipment, and ability to perform 
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and complete his contracts in th~ manner and 
within the time limit specified will be vital ele-
ments, along with the case amount of the bid, 
which will be considered by the Owner in the 
letting of the contract. (Page GC/9) 
4. GENERAL REQUIRE~lENTS: 
a. Each manufacturer shall submit a letter 
to the Architect, listing three ( 3) major Arena's 
that are using the seating he is offering. This 
letter in addition to the name of Arena, must give 
the location and the name of Arena and the name 
and mailing address of the Manager of the 
Arena, so that the Architect and Owner can ob-
tain whatever information is deemed necessary. 
Failuer to submit such a list, or upon verification 
by Architect and Owner that the Arena listed is 
not equipped with such chairs, shall be sufficient 
cause for rejection of his bid. 
b. Each manufacturer shall submit to the De-
partment of Planning and Construction at the 
University of Utah a sample of the exact riser 
mounted two seat section that he will submit a 
proposal for. Samples must be representative in 
every detail to the item intended. Failure to 
comply will constitute grounds for disqualifica-
tion of the bid. Such samples shall be delivered 
at no expense to the Owner five calendar days 
prior to the bid opening date. (Page All) 
The specifications identified the "Owner," as that 
term was used therein, as the State of Utah, as repre-
sented by the State Building Board. 
Plaintiff submitted a bid on all three types of its 
seats that were specified, and as intervenor has stated, 
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proposed two deductive alternatives with respect to the 
'l'ype 3 seat. First a deduction of $0.51 per seat if the 
plastic arms, which were only specified on this model 
and not on the other three seats, were to be left off; and 
second, a reduced price of $1.75 per seat if the self-riser 
specified was eliminated ( R. 29) . 
The bidding of the deductive alternates was in 
keeping with the following provisions of the specifica-
tions (Exhibit P-1) . 
Sec. 31, SUBSTITUTIONS: 
1. Reference in the specifications to any ar-
ticle, device, product, material, fixture, form or 
type of construction by name, make or catalog 
number shall be interpreted as establishing a 
standard of quality and shall not be construed as 
limiting competition; and the Contractor, in such 
cases, may at his option use any article, device, 
product, material, fixture, form or type of con-
struction which is equal to that specified. 
2. Bidders may submit bids on nominated sub-
stitute items other than those noted in the ac-
companying specifications. Those Contractors 
nominated substitutes, shall be submitted under 
the following procedure: 
(a) The Contractor nominating a substitute 
must accompany his bids with full specifications, 
catalogs, cuts, photographs, and samples of each 
item and must be prepared upon request to dem-
onstrate to the Owner and the Architect, that the 
item bid is the equivalent of or superior to the 
item described in the accompanying specifica-
tions. 
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(b) The Contractor shall name the substitute 
item, together with the amount to be added to or 
deducted from his/their bid. 
( c) The Owner and representatives of the 
University and Architect, shall evaluate all pro-
posals including items submitted as substitutions. 
The Architect shall evaluate all submittals and 
make recommendatio.as l.o the Owner following 
consultation with representatives of the Univer-
sity of Utah. As to items to be purchased it 
shall be understood by all bidders that a certain 
intent is made in the preparation of these docu-
ments, and that seats not compatible to the style, 
technical features and other evaluated items, may 
not be recommended for purchase by the Owner. 
The price quoted by the vendor is not necessarily 
the only criteria to be eYaluated, and if the low 
bid item is not of quality of other proposed items, 
the Owner may elect to purchase such items on 
the basis of the performance of these specif ica-
tions. 
(Finding 6, R. 43) 
The bidders, pursuant to the requirements of the 
specifications, submitted samples along with their bids 
of the types of seats that they bid upon together with 
information concerning the locations of installations 
using such seats. The Buildings and Grounds Com-
mittee of the University of Utah Board of Regents, 
inspected and tested the seat samples and had engineers 
from the University of Utah visit and inspect the in-
stallations where the various seats had been installed and 
were in use (R. 102, 103). In addition, this Committee 
held hearings where representatives of the competing 
8 
bidders explained the advantages and disadvantages of 
their respective seats ( R. 94). 
The Board of Regents, at its meeting of June 30, 
1967, approved recommending to the Building Board 
the acceptance of the plaintiff's bid on Seat Type 3, 
leaving it up to the University administration whether 
to exclude or include the self-rising feature (R. 25-26, 
93) . This meeting preceded any controversy over the 
bids. Subsequently, the Board of Regents considered 
the matter at its meeting of December 11, 1967, after 
the Attorney General's opinion. The minutes of that 
meeting detailed the reasons that the Building and 
Grounds Committee continued to believe that plain-
tiff's seat was superior, and contained another resolution 
from the Board finding that the plaintiff's bid was the 
lowest and best bid because the difference in price 
between it and the intervenor's bid was more than off set 
by the better quality of the plaintiff's seat ( R. 26). The 
Board then resolved again to recommend to the Build-
ing Board that it purchase the Type 3 seat without the 
alternate deductions for the total sum of $301,987.98. 
This price exceeded intervenor's bid of $296,049.18 by 
approximately 35 cents per seat. 
Subsequent to the opening of the bids and the 
determination by the Board of Regents at its June 
meeting in 1967 that the plaintiff's Type 3 seat should 
be acquired, with or without the self-risers, the plaintiff 
wrote a letter to the University advising the University 
that if it wanted to accept this type seat without the 
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self-riser and later determined that it wished a self-
riser installed, that this could be accomplished for the 
same price per self-riser unit as bid for an improved 
self-riser product (R. 36). Such a proposal was clearly 
authorized and in keeping with the following provisions 
of the specifications (Exhibit P-1) : 
"Sec. 11. CHANGES IN THE WORK: 
1. The Owner, without invalidating the con-
tract, may order extra items or make changes 
by altering, adding to, or deducting from the 
specified items, the contract sum being adjusted 
in accordance with the unit price submitted. All 
such work shall be executed under the conditions 
of the original contract, except that any claim 
or extension of time caused thereby shall be ad-
justed at the time of authorization of such 
change. 
2. In giving instructions, the Architect shall 
have the authority to make minor changes in the 
work not involving extra cost, and not inconsist-
ent with the Contract Documents and the purpose 
of the building." (Page GC/3) 
The Building Board, upon receiving the recommen-
dations of the University Board of Regents, made its 
own independent investigation of the bids. It was pre-
paring to issue a contract for the seating to the plaintiff 
when intervenor's counsel by letter of July 18, 1967, 
requested the Attorney General to intervene (Exhibit 
P-6). The Attorney General by letter of the same date 
directed the Director of the Building Board to stay any 
final action until his office had completed an investiga-
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tion (Exhibit P-5). In the latter part of July, 19ti7, a 
hearing was hdd before members of the 13uilding Board 
staff, the Department of 1''inance, the University ad-
ministration, and the Attorney General, at which rep-
resentatives of both bidders presented samples of their 
seats and arguments in favor of their particular product 
(Exhibit P-8). 
The Attorney General in a letter opinion dated 
September 1, 1968, informed the Director of the Buil<l-
ing Doard that it could not award the contract to the 
plaintiff and should award the contract to the intervenor 
in order to avoid incurring financial liability to the 
intervenor ( R. 32-33). 
In January of 1968 formal presentations, together 
with sample products, were made by the bidders to all 
members of the Building Board in formal session ( R. 
117) .T he Board unanimously concluded that the plain-
tiff's bid was the best bid and that the difference in 
price was more than offset by the better quality of 
plaintiffs seat. Pursuant to the Board action, the Direc-
tor advised the Department of Finance that the plain-
tiff's bid should be accepted and the contract awarded 
to the Plaintiff (R. 24). The Department of Finance 
responded that the contract would not be given to the 
plaintiff as requested by both the Board of Regents 
of the University and the State Building Board, because 
of the Attorney General's letter of September 1, 1967 
(R. 25). 
The funds to be used by the State of Utah for the 
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acquisition and installation of these seats, together with 
the funds for the construction of the "Special Events 
Center," came from the sale of student fee revenue bonds 
(R. 82) issued pursuant to the authority of Chapter 38 
of Title 53, U.S.A., 1953, as amended (R. 91). These 
funds, known as "campus funds," are held in a trust 
fund and disbursed pursuant to resolutions of the Board 
of Regents of the University. (R. 82, 92, 116; Exhibit 
P-2.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
DECLARING THAT UNDER APPLICABLE 
UTAH STATUTES THE CONTRACTING 
AUTHORITY IS GIVEN DISCRETION TO 
CONSIDER Tl-IE QUALITY 01:1' THE PROD-
UCTS BID AS WELL AS THE BID PRICE. 
Intervenor cites two statutes in now acknowledging 
that the State Building Board has authority to let the 
contract for the Arena seating, and urges that under 
these statutes the Board must always contract with the 
low bidder, no matter what compelling considerations 
exist that such is not the best bid or in the public in-
terest. Plaintiff asserted below that because "campus 
funds" provide the capital to build and furnish the 
Sports and Social Events Center, Section 53-38-5, 
U.C.A. 1953, cited by appellant, is controlling. It is 
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submitted, however, that this controlling section is not 
restricted, as intervenor contends, by Section 63-10-'7, 
so that the Building Board does not have the clear 
authority given i~ by the express language of Section 
53-38-5, 
" . . . to make all contracts and execute all 
instruments which in its discretion may be 
deemed necessary or advisable to provide for the 
acquisition, purchase, construction, furnishing 
and equipment of the building and the acquisi-
tion of all necessary land therefor .... " 
Neither of these two sections now relied upon by 
the intervenor was mentioned, or apparently even con-
sidered, by the Attorney General in the letter opinion 
procured by the intervenor and dated September 1, 
1967 (R. 32-33). The Attorney General cited Sections 
li4-l-5 and 63-2-29, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as 
amended, as controlling, and erroneously indicated that 
these sections required the awarding of a bid to the 
lowest bidder who was financially responsible, and pre-
cluded the owner from determining which bid was most 
consistent with its interests, regardless of cost, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Item 4, Section 2 of 
the Specification (Exhibit P-1, page IB/l). 
The Attorney General's letter indicated that the 
contract which the Board of Regents and Building 
Board wished to enter into with the plaintiff may have 
been "negotiated," and that this unfounded charge 
may have influenced the opinion. Apparently this came 
from in1 ~rvenor, who, on page 10 of its brief, implies 
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that the Building Board had dickered and finagled with 
the bidders. Suffice it to say that the sworn testimony 
and uncontroverted evidence established that the bid-
ding and all subsequent actions of the plaintiff were 
proper and above reproach, and that both the Board of 
Regents and the Building Board gave both bidders ar~ 
equal opportunity at several open hearings to present 
their case before any final decision was made. Because 
of intervenor's continued efforts to imply wrong-doing, 
plaintiff felt obliged to set forth in detail the actual 
facts of this transaction and designate as part of the 
record the transcript of the testimony ( R. 61). 
The Attorney General's letter recognized that Sec-
tion 64-1-5 requires the contract to be let to "the lowest 
responsible bidder," and that Section 63-2-29 requires 
it to be let to "the responsible bidder making the lowest 
and best bid." Apparently because the contract was 
handled by the Building Board the Attorney General 
stated: "'7\Thile this element does not affect our con-
clusion, it appears obvious that the seating contract 
has been regarded by everyone as a contract to be ad-
ministered in accordance with § 64-1-5." This particular 
section covers the letting by the Building Board of 
contracts for the repair or construction of state build-
ings. Section 63-2-29 authorizes the Director of Finance 
to contract for various items, including equipment, 
furniture, furnishings, office supplies, etc. The differ-
ence in language between these two section ("lowest 
responsible bidder," "lowest alld best bid,") appears to 
have originated because the former dealt with con-
14 
struction contracts in which numerous materials were 
specified, along with required lab9r, with the contractor 
submitting an over-all bid and choosing which of the 
specified materials he would use, while in the acquisi-
tion of items of equipment, furnishings, office supplies, 
etc., various specific items are available which are not 
always equal in quality or performance, and thus a 
specific evaluation by the owner of the items was 
required. 
In this case if "campus funds" had not been in-
volved, and if there had been no installation of the 
seating required by the bidder, then the seating would 
have been obtained as furniture by the Department of 
Finance under Section 63-2-29 (R. 109, 133). Because 
"campus funds" were involved, the Building Board was 
charged to handle the contract under Section 53-38-5. 
It is, however, immaterial to a determination of this 
case which of these four statutes is controlling, for 
whether a legislative provision requires that a public 
contract be awarded to the "lowest responsible bidder," 
or the "lowest and best bidder," or to a similarly desig-
nated bidder, it is generally held that the awarding 
officials may take into consideration the differences or 
variations in the character or quality of the materials, 
articles or work proposed to be furnished by the respec-
tive bidders in determining who should be awarded the 
contract. See 27 A.L.R. 2d., 926 for a review of the 
overwhelming authority of the courts which have faced 
this question. See also 43 Am. Jur., 786, where the first 
paragraph of Section 44 states: 
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" ... Usually, however, as pointed out above, 
the contract is not required to be awarded to the 
lowest bidder, without qualification, but is to be 
awarded to the 'lowest and best bidder,' etc., and 
there is but little dissent from the general rule 
that in determining who is such 'lowest respon-
sible bidder,' 'lowest and best bidder,' etc., public 
boards and officials are vested with wide dis-
cretion, and their decision, when based upon an 
honest exercise of the discretion thus vested in 
them, will not be interfered with by the courts, 
even if erroneous. Under this rule, public author-
ities may exercise discretion as to quality of 
material or workmanship, and its adaptability 
to the particular use or purpose desired, and, 
according to the weight of authority are allowecl 
to make a choice between different kinds of ma-
terials, when, by the terms of the specifications, 
competition, is open ~s to all kinds, provided, of 
course, that the choice must be reasonable, and 
not fraudulent or arbitrary. V\There contracts are 
to be let on terms most advantageous to the state 
or to the public, the discretion in making the 
award is particularly broad, and will not be in-
terfered with by the courts if exercised on a 
rational basis, without fraud or palpable abuse." 
Two Utah cases confirm the general principle that 
in the expenditure of public funds the designated agency 
has the responsibility to procure the best facility for the 
money, and is not bound to the acceptance of a low-
dollar bid. In passing, we note that these cases so held, 
even in the absence of a statute, such as we have here, 
stating that "discretion" should be utilized. 
In Clayton v. Salt Lake City, 15 Utah 2d 57, 387 
16 
P. 2d 93 ( l !:)IJJ) , the court affirmed the summary 
judgment :for defendant in a suit by taxpayers to pro-
hibit the acceptance of the next lowest bid for the 
construction of the public safety and jail building. The 
case might be distinguishable on the grounds that the 
offer of the iowest bidder did not conform to the speci-
fications. However, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that even if the variations by the lowest bidder were 
permissable, it would not follow that the lowest bid 
must be accepted. It stated, at page 59: 
"Its (the joint authority) responsibility was to 
accept that bid, which in its judgment would 
provide the best possible facility for the money. 
Inherent in the nature of its duties and its 
presumed superior knowledge and expertise in 
performing them, the public authority must 
have a wide latitude in which to exercise its judg-
ment as to the best means of accomplishing that 
objective. The court is reluctant to interfere with 
the administrative function and would do so only 
if facts were shown to indicate dishonesty, fraud, 
collusion or lack of good faith in performing the 
duty mentioned. That is not demonstrated here. 
"Accordingly it was within the prerogative of 
the Joint Authority to accept the bid of Southern 
Steel, even at a somewhat higher price, if it 
thought, as it insists it did, that it would construct 
a better facility and thus be the more prudent 
use of public funds." 
The court relied on Schulte v. Salt Lake City, 79 
Utah 272, 10 P. 2d 625 (1932) in its decision. There 
the plaintiff taxpayer challenged the award of a sewer 
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construction contract by Salt Lake City to the next 
to lowest bidder. The Court indicated that the statute 
governing improvements made from the general funds 
may not be applicable and even if it were, it does not 
require letting to the lowest responsible bidder. None-
theless, the court states at page 300, after citing the 
general rule regarding the broad discretion of officers 
of a city in letting contracts for public improvement, as 
follows: 
" ... A similar rule prevails in most jurisdic-
tions under statutes which require that contracts 
for public improvements be let to the lowest re-
sponsible bidder. In such case the officers whose 
duty it is to award the contracts are vested with 
discretion in determining who is the most respon-
sible and best bidder. Responsibility is not, ac-
cording to the weight of judicial authority, 
confined to financial responsibility. It includes 
the experience, skill, ability and honesty of the 
bidders. Courts will not interfere with the de-
cision of the city authorities in awarding a con-
tract if such decision is founded upon such facts 
that it is not a manifest abuse of discretion, is 
exercised in good faith, is in the interest of the 
public and is without collusion or fraud, and is 
not influenced by motives of personal favoritism 
or ill will. The foregoing rules are supported by 
the great weight of authority. They are founde<l 
upon sound reasons." 
The Attorney General's letter opinion of Septem-
ber 1, 1967, seemingly reversed a prior opinion from 
that office on the same subject which had been out-
standing and controlling for a number of years. In a 
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letter opinion to the Utah State Building Board dat .... d 
.March 3, 1959, the Attorney General construed the 
same Section 63-10-7, which intervenor contendt: is 
controlling and limits the Building Board to the minis-
terial act of determining only the lowest bid in the 
awarding of contracts. This earlier opinion concluded 
as follows: 
"On the basis of the wide latitude given by the 
courts to the awarding authority and the liberal 
interpretation of 'lowest responsible bidder' 
statutes adopted by the courts, we conclude that 
for the benefit and protection of the public and 
when it is to the best interest and advantage of 
the state so to do, you may consider time of com-
pletion as a factor in determining lowest bidder 
in awarding a building contract. The degree to 
which you shall consider time as a factor is within 
your discretion, said discretion to be exercised in 
good faith and not in capricious or arbitrary 
" manner. 
This well-considered opinion cited pertinent case 
and general law which is helpful in our present case. 
Page 2 of this opinion stated as follows: 
"There has been much litigation as to who is 
the 'lowest bidder'. 'Lowest bidder' statutes are 
mandatory and where the statute simply says 
'lowest bidder' without other words of qualifica-
tion, the courts have held that such a statute 
endows the awarding authorities with only the 
ministerial duty of determining who is the 
'lowest' bidder, and does not give them any judi-
cial or discretionary authority. (27 A.L.R. 2d 
937). However, the courts do allow such authvr-
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ity where the applicable provision contains some 
qualifying word, such as 'responsible,' or where 
the authority is granted to determine whether an 
award to the lowest bidder would be for the best 
interest of the people, or where the right is 
granted to reject any and all bids, or wh~re, as in 
our statute, judgment is reserved as to the re-
sponsibility and qualifications of the bidder. 
"In these latter situations the low bid is not 
necessarily the one lowest in dollars and cents. 
The courts have held that the awarding authority 
may consider such things as competency, ability, 
promptness, skill and business judgment, experi-
ence, integrity, and previous conduct. 'The term 
"responsible" is not, however, limited to pecu-
niary ability ... but pertains to many other 
characteristics of the bidder, such as his general 
ability and capacity to carry on the work, his 
equipment and facilities, his promptness, and the 
quality of work previously done by him. . .. ' 
(State v. Board of Comm. of Nebraska, 181 
N:\V. 530, 105 Neb. 570). All matters bearing 
upon the likelihood the contract will be promptly 
and efficiently performed bear upon the question 
of responsibility of bidders and may and should 
be considered in determining who is the 'lowest 
responsible bidder.' ( 43 Am. J ur., Public Works 
and Contracts, Sec. 42, and cases cited). 
"In determining who is the 'lowest responsible 
bidder' public boards and officials are vested 
with wide discretion, and their decision, when 
based upon an honest exercise of the discretion 
thus vested in them, will not be interfered with 
by the courts, even if erroneous. Of course, a 
public board or official cannot act arbitrarily, 
but an honest determination that a bidder's bid, 
20 
though the lowest, is not the best, will 1Jrdinarily 
control. ( 43 Am .• Tur., Public \Vorks and Co,;-
tract.s, Ste. 44•, and cases cite<l). See also ~Ii:-_;­
souri Service Co. v. City of Stanberry, 108 S.\\'. 
:;;d, ~5, ~~-H ;;Io. u<J;J. 
"Where, either by statute or by the advertise-
ment for bids, the right to reject any or all bids 
is resened, an even wider descretion is vested 
in the awarding authority. In such a situation 
there is no binding obligatic~n to award the con-
tract to any bidder and although all bids are 
rejected and new bids asked for, the courts will 
seldom, if ever, interfere." 
The concluding paragraph above is significant in the 
present case for the specifications for the seating contain 
an express provision authorizing the owner to reject 
any and all bids (Section 2, subsection 5, page IB/l and 
2) and the Building Boar,Q has express statutory au-
thority to do this (Section 64-1-5, U.C.A., 1953). For 
the discretion implicit in the power to reject all bids, 
see 27 A.L.R. 2d 924 where it is stated: 
"Where public officials have the right to reject 
any and all bids for a public contract, the view 
is generally taken that they may consider the 
difference or variations in the character or qual-
itv of the materials, articles, or work proposed 
t~ be furnished by the various bidders, in deter-
mining whether to accept any of the bids, or 
which bid to accept." 
Section 63-10-7 was initially passed in 1929, a 
number of years prior to the initial passage of 53-38-5 in 
1947. The introductory and final paragraphs from this 
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earlier section establish that its express prov1s10ns are 
not meant to be limitations on the power or authority 
of the State Building Board, but merely an expression 
of certain powers. While the introductory paragraph 
was cited in the intervenor's brief, the final paragraph 
of this section was not. It states as follows: 
63-10-7. 
" ( 19) The foregoing particular enumeration 
of powers is intended only for the purpose of 
clearly providing certain powers deemed particu-
larly important, and shall not be cons trued as 
limiting the powers and authority granted to the 
board to those powers particularly enumerated, 
nor even to the general classes thereof; Lut it is 
expressly declared that the Utah State Building 
Board is vested with full power and authority 
to do any and all things which in its judgment 
may be necessary or proper for carrying out any 
of the purposes of this chapter, including the 
making of necessary and proper expenditures, 
with the approval of the governor, of state 
money; provided, that no expenditures shall be 
made or authorized in excess of the amount from 
time to time appropriated therefor and that all 
expenditures shall be made in the manner pro-
vided by law upon the order of the board, subject 
to approval by the department of finance before 
payment is made." 
The discretionary power given to the Building 
Board in the making of contracts involving "campus 
funds" by Section 53-8-5 was provided to insure the 
construction of buildings and the purchase and instal-
lation of furniture and equipment that the Building 
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Board in its wisdom, experience and prudence would 
deem to be best suited for the intended use at the par-
ticular campus. The same statute also gives certain 
controls in the expenditure of the "campus funds" to 
the Board of Regents of the particular institution in-
volved. In the present case, there was the coordinated 
exercise of the judgments of the University Board of 
Regents and the State Building Hoard in favor of the 
seating bid by plaintiff for $301,987.98 on the sound 
and proper basis that such seating was the best for the 
intended purpose and would therefore be the more 
prudent use of the "campus funds." The trial court, 
under these circumstances, properly concluded that the 
Building Board was authorized and empowered to give 
the contract to the plaintiff and was not bound to 
contract with the intervenor. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CON-
SIDERED AND DECIDED THIS DECLARA-
TORY JUDGMENT ACTION AND INTER-
VENOR HAS NO RIGHT TO PROTEST THE 
TRIAL COURT'S CONSIDERING THIS CASE. 
It is difficult to understand just what intervenor 
is contending for in its Point 2. The heading states: 
"THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
PLAINTIFF HAD A LEGALLY PROTECT-
ABLE INTEREST AND STANDING IN 
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COURT TO PREVENT EXECFTION O.F A 
CONTRACT BE'f"\VEEN TlIE STATE BUILD-
ING BOARD AND INTERYENOR." 
This indicates that the trial court prevented the 
execution of a contract between the Building Board 
and intervenor, which is simply not the fact. This was 
accomplished by this Supreme Court entering a \V rit 
of Prohibition and thus there is no basis for such a 
complaint against the trial court. The contention that 
plaintiff had no standing to bring this us it for declara-
tory judgment was previously considered by this court 
and rejected when the \V rit of Prohibition was issued. 
While the trial court did state in the judgment 
that the plaintiff was a corporation, contractor, and 
taxpayer of this state, and had proper standing and a 
right to maintain this proceeding (R. 38), no con-
tention to the contrary was ever asserted by the defend-
ants in this proceeding which, of course, followed the 
issuance of the Writ of Prohibition. It is respect£ ully 
submitted that the intervenor, a Texas corporation not 
qualified to do business in this state, has only one in-
terest in this proceeding, and that is as a bidder on the 
contract in question. As such, the intervenor has no 
right to assert a lack of standing by the plaintiff, who 
is a Utah corporation, business, and taxpayer, and was 
the bidder designated by the contracting agency to 
obtain the contract. There is clearly no one with a 
greater right and standing to challenge the erroneous 
ruling by the Attorney General, the effect of which 
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was to deprive the plaintiff of this substantial contract 
and the taxpayers an<l citizens of this state of the best 
judgment and experience of the State Building Board, 
the contracting authority charged to exercise such judg-
ment and experience in the public interest. 
Assuming the question of standing had been 
properly raised by the defendants who were the parties 
to this suit who could assert such an issue, the plaintiff 
would still have been determined to have standing to 
bring this declaratory judgment action. Intervenor 
claims the general rule that the judiciary will not in-
terfere with the administrative actions of the executive 
forecloses the plaintiffs from bringing this suit and cites 
as authority for such position Schulte v. Salt Lake City, 
supra, and Clayton v. Salt Lake City, supra. This rule, 
and these cases, are readily distinguishable and provide 
no support for intervenor's contention. In fact, they are 
in direct conflict because in these cases an unsuccessful 
bidder was permitted to sue, but the courts, while 
accepting the suit, ruled that they would not interfere 
with the administrative discretion that was exercised in 
making the award to another bidder. Here we do not 
have a suit by an unsuccessful bidder, but rather by a 
successful bidder who was prevented from obtaining the 
contract by an erroneous construction by the Attorney 
General of certain statutes involving the bidding of 
state contracts. The plaintiff in this case, therefore, was 
a taxpayer with a substantial pecuniary interest and 
an advesary position, and thus had what the court 
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found to be lacking in the plaintiff in Lyon v. Bateman. 
119 Utah 434, 228 P. 2d 818, relied on by the intervenor. 
Occasionally cases have indicated an unsuccessful 
bidder has no standing to question the granting of a 
bid to another bidder because the letting of the contract 
is for the benefit of the public and the bidder has no 
vested right in the contract. 80 A.L.R. 1382, 1392; 43 
C.J.S. Injunction, § 120. 55 C.J.S. Mandamus, § 166. 
These cases are distinguishable from the present case 
where plaintiff Was the successful bidder in the deter-
mination of the contracting authority. Even these cases, 
however, upon close examination, reveal that there has 
been no careful distinction made between the right of 
the unsuccessful bidder to raise the issue of compliance 
with the statute and the inability or reluctance of the 
court to grant relief to the unsuccessful bidder by com-
pelling a contracting authority, with discretion, to 
award the contract to him. 
The sound argument can be made that even an 
unsuccessful bidder should be allowed to sue to protect 
the public's interest in assuring compliance with the 
statute, even though the court will not award the con-
tract to the complaining bidder where the contracting 
authorities can exercise discretion. The unsuccessful 
bidder will still have an incentive to prevent the im-
proper awarding of the contract. A taxpayer with such 
public spirit may not be found. Consequently a number 
of courts, particularly in the more recent years, have 
allowed the unsuccessful bidder to bring such a suit. 
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Brown v. City of Phoenix, 77 Ariz. 368, 272 P. 2d 358 
( 1954) ; Staie ex. rel. Werner v. District Court of ~Pirst 
Judicial District, 142 lVIont. 145, 382 P. 2d 824 (1963); 
Johnson v. Craddock, 228 Ore. 308, 365 P. 2d 89 
( 1961) ; Angelo J. lJ;Jartone ~ Son Inc. v. County of 
Nassau, 42 .Misc. 2d 804, 249 N.Y.S. 353 (1964); D_ic-
taphone Corp. v. O'Leary, 287 N.W. 491, 41 N.E. 2d 
68 (1942); State ex. rel. Democrat Printing Co. v. 
Schmiege, 18 \Vis. 2d 325, 118 N.,V. 2d 845 (1963). 
While Utah apparently has not directly ruled on 
the right of an unsuccessful bidder to raise the issue of 
compliance with a statute or controlling law, it seems 
clear that this court has held that a taxpayer may bring 
such a suit. The Clayton and Schulte cases, supra, are 
directly in point in support of this rule, and the rule 
appears to have been generally followed in similar cases 
from other jurisdictions. See J. C. Lewis Motor Co. 
Inc. v. Mayor, etc., of City of Savannah, 210 Ga. 591, 
82 S.E. 2d 132 (1954); Application of Air Terminal 
Services, Inc., 47 Hawaii 499, 393 P. 2d 60 (1964); 
Hannan v. Board of Education, 25 Okla. 372, 107 P. 
646 (1909); Leskinen v. Pucelj, 262 l\'Iinn. 461, 115 
N.vV. 2d 346 (1962); Duffy v. Village of Princeton, 
240 Minn. 9, 60 N.W. 2d 27 (19.53); Day v. Beatrice, 
169 N eh. 858, 101 N.W. 2d 481 (1960). 
For several recent cases in which this court upheld 
the right of a taxpayer to challenge the validity of 
proposed governmental action or the legality of a legis-
lative enactment, see Rich v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 
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2d 339, 437 P. 2d 690, and Carter v. Beaver County 
Service Area, No. l, llG Utah 2d 280, 399 P. 2d 440. 
In this case plaintiff was the successful bidder, but 
even if the plaintiff was determined to be the unsuccess-
ful bidder, it was also a taxpayer able to show a sub-
stantial injury, and therefore entitled to bring this suit 
for declaratory judgment. State v. Mitchell, 105 
Mont. 326, 74 P. 2d 417 ( 1937); Beasley v. Dailey, 
222 Ark. 339, 260 S.,V.2d 442 (1953) ;Ha:nnan v. Board 
of Education, supra; Times Puh. Co. v. City of Everett, 
9 Wash. 518, 37 P. 69.5 ( 1894). The trial court there-
fore properly concluded that the plaintiff had the 
proper standing and right to maintain this proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
The law controlling the facts and circumstances 
of this case authorizes and supports the declaratory 
judgment of the lower court and therefore this court 
should affirm. 
Respect£ ully submitted, 
DAVID K. WATKISS, 
OF PUGSLEY, HAYES, 
RAMPTON & 'VATKISS 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
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